(intro) kabbalah

The kabbalah has three fundamental interpretations or aspects.

I. the kabbalah as metaphysics.
II. the kabbalah as practice.
II. the kabbalah as psychological theory.

In order to understand the kabbalistic literature, one must consider all three. Nevertheless, it is commensurate with this literature to hold only one (or any combination) as the correct interpretation.

9 / 11

One event at the start of the third millenium anno domini changed the face of US foreign policy, US domestic policy, and, correspondingly, the security policies of most of the world. Travel by air has always exposed one to insult and humiliation by the airlines, but now the government itself has stepped in to ensure that every single traveller is treated with the same respect and decency as a common criminal. The "privilege" of habeas corpus has been suspended, a measure only licensed by the Constitution "in cases of rebellion or invasion." Yet questions still remain about the exact nature of the events that transpired that day and where exactly they fit in the historical map of US foreign and domestic policy. Even if a fully comprehensize answer to these questions is impossible, some kind of stopgap account is needed, and those presently available are far from adequate.

Questions about the events of 9/11 are often framed in terms of "official story" versus "conspiracy theories." Yet this dichotomy is spurious. For one thing, unlike in the cases of the JFK assassination, Pearl Harbor, and most other events which have inspired "conspiracy theories," the "official story" here also involves a theory about a conspiracy. Thus, the choice is quite literally between rival conspiracy theories (I have yet to see a non-conspiracy explanation for these events). Furthermore, it is a mistake to think there is a single, uniform "official story." The only unifying feature of advocates of the supposed "official story" is a kneejerk rejection of any criticism of the behavior of the US government or its officials concerning the events of Sept. 11. The 9/11 Commission Report does not provide an "official story" along these lines for a variety of reasons. First, it is far from complete, failing to address many issues potentially relevant to the events of Sept. 11, 2001 (e.g. the collapse of Building 7). Second, it is actually quite critical of various government agencies as dramatized in The Path to 9/11. Third, the findings of the commission on certain key issues, in particular the scientific explanation for the collapse of the Twin Towers, are no longer a part of the consensus view. Strangely, the abandonment of the "pancake theory" in favor of the (slightly) more sophisticated NIST account vidicates early "conspiracy theorist" criticisms of both the theory itself, and the willingness to accept such an absurd theory on the part of the investigative committee.

However, it is not only the "official story" which has been unjustly treated as a well-defined and comprehensive account, the "conspiracy theories" as well are far from homogenous. "Conspiracy theories" can differ dramatically in both the nature of their accusations and the extent to which these diverge from the "official" consensus. Here's a sampling of the widely divergent nature of the accusations and sources:

Gross incompetence was demonstrated by the government in the years and months leading up to Sept. 11, 2001. In particular, adequate information on both the danger of bin Laden / al Qaeda and the specifics of the attack was available to the FBI and CIA, yet administrative red tape and cowardice prevented them from acting.
~ The Path to 9/11

Gross incompetence or criminally poor judgment was demonstrated by the government in planning a domestic defense exercise which would leave our nation's skies uncharacteristically unguarded on Sept. 11, 2001.
~ The 9/11 Commission Report

The government knowingly and with malicious forethought not only permitted the hijackings but furthermore assisted them and manipulated the events of Sept. 11, 2001 for maximum shock value on the American people.
~ Loose Change, Painful Questions, etc.

Either gross incompetence of deliberate malice has been demonstrated by the government in the events since Sept. 11, 2001 as it has fabricated an organization (al Qaeda) which actually has no substantive existence outside government imagination / delusion.
~ The Power of Nightmares

Deliberate malice and blatant opportunism has been demonstrated by the government in its behavior since Sept. 11, 2001. In particular, it willing failed to pursue bin Laden with maximum prejudice and instead merely juggled information until it could drum up enough public support for a war in Iraq.
~ Fahrenheit 9/11

This is only a rough sampling of the variety of accusations and theories out there. Rather than focus upon where exactly in this continuum of possible positions to demarcate the "official story," the crackpot "conspiracy theories," or the legitimate criticisms, I think there are pragmatic questions which can be answered without fomenting sectarian rivalries.

1. For domestic policy: Were there security measures in place before Sept. 11, 2001 which, if implemented correctly, would most likely have prevented the attacks from succeeding? This question is abosolutely crucial. The gross disruption of liberties, the denial of habeas corpus, the legalization of warrantless government spying, etc. which have been perpetrated upon the American people over the last 6 years depend for their justification on the thesis that the 2001 attacks succeeded because sufficient preventative measures were not in place. If it turns out that sufficient measures were in place, they were merely were not implemented as designed, then our focus should not be on giving government more power, but on reforming the existing government power structures to remove the threat of incompetence. I believe the evidence (including that of the "official" Commission Report) points overwhelmingly to an affirmative answer to this question; however, there is no consensus.

2. For foreign policy: Was interventionist US foreign policy in the decades before 2001 a major causal factor in the attacks of Sept. 11? If the answer to this question is "yes," then the US should reconsider its strategy for preventing future terror attacks with an aggressively interventionist foreign policy. The answer to this question most certainly is "yes," with the consensus overwhelming. In fact, so far as I know, the only group in the world which wouldn't answer in the affirmative here is the Republican presidential hopefuls. Nevertheless, I repeat, there is widespread consensus on this point, yet our foreign policy proceeds along interventionist lines without the subtle and convincing arguments needed to justify this strategy in a post-9/11 world.

3. For the peace of mind of the American people, for the dignity of the US in the eyes of the world, and to provide a consensus on the answer to (1): Is there sufficient cause to initiate a new independent investigation into the events of Sept. 11, 2001? Here, again, I believe the answer to be "yes." The fact that we have no consensus answer to (1), the single most important question for the daily lives of the American people, is reason enough for a new independent investigation.

I do not expect to ever discover the "truth" of the events of Sept. 11, 2001. Furthermore, such a goal is unnecessarily ambitious. Nevertheless, pragmatic considerations alone prove our current understanding of these events inadequate. The only responsible behavior for the US government is to a) initiate an independent investigation which will deliver a definitive answer (at least) to (1); b) heed the consensus position on (2) and, at the very least, offer the American people a more robust and nuanced justification for its current foreign policy choices (ie one sensitive to the role of an interventionist foreign policy in instigating the 2001 attack).

informationless age

We must make a sharp distinction between data and evidence. Data are measurements, details, numbers ~ data simpliciter say nothing about any theory, any story about how and why these details and numbers fit together. Only evidence can support or refute a theory, and the process of turning data into evidence is neither trivial nor even congenial to any general systematization. At the very least, this process incorporates a vast array of background beliefs and expectations which, themselves, are immune to evidential support.

The "information age" is an age of increased data, not facts or evidence. The never-ending stream of "factoids" which the internet presents to us cannot hold the full-fledged status of "facts," as for every factoid that A, there exists another that not-A, and it is an intrinsic characteristic of facts that they are true. Since, A and not-A cannot both simultaneously be true, they cannot simultaneously be facts, and thus not all factoids are facts. Surely, some factoids are facts, and thus all we need is a theory about which "information sources" can be trusted and which cannot. Here, however, we run into the problem of turning data into evidence. For the trustworthiness of a given "information source" can only be judged against a background of prior beliefs and expectations. Thus, the factoids originating in that source alone give no evidence about its authenticity, they are merely data.

If all the factoids, all the "information," available on the internet is merely data, than the modern e-citizen is faced with the monumental task of turning data into evidence not just for theories about the world, but also for theories about the reliability of data-sources. This second-order uncertainty ensures that any modern e-citizen knows less in this "information age" than ever before ~ for the sheer proliferation of "information sources" via the internet magnifies the conceptual problem of validating said sources past the finite bounds of human ability. Yet faith in certainty ever abounds, and certainty has proved itself the chimera of the modern age.

The wise man says: attestation to knowledge is the hallmark of madmen and fundamentalists.

parody, paranoia, or prescience?

"You're not very humorous, are you?"
"Not at all. I recently had a dream that capitalism invented terrorism to force the state to protect it better . . . very funny, isn't it?"
[raucous laughter]

~ Die Dritte Generation

pleurisy

A symptom without a disease, a punishment without a crime, an effect without a cause.

the summer solstice

tall narrow glass, preferably widening near the top
ice
honey
cucumber
ice-cold vodka
cranberry juice
sparkling water

Place several large ice cubes in glass. Cut 8 - 10 thin slices of cucumber and distribute these on top of the ice cubes. Pour vodka over ice and cucumbers, filling 1/3 - 1/2 of glass (depending on how much it widens near the top). Make sure you use as clear and flavorless a vodka as you can find - this is not a drink to cover up the pungent taste of rotgut - I've been using Smirnoff. Furthermore, using ice-cold vodka ensures the drink mixes itself. Next, pour on a tiny splash of cranberry juice; the red from this should sink to the bottom. Fill remainder of glass with sparkling water (make sure it's not flavored - I've been using Pellegrino). Finally, put a dab of honey on the end of a flat knife and rub gently around the rim of the glass. If all goes well, you'll have a refreshing summer drink. Ideally, the main taste should be of cucumbers, with the water and vodka acting as a mere vehicle for this delicate flavor. Resist the urge to use too much vodka or too much honey. The cranberry juice really only serves to counterbalance the vodka flavor, ideally one shouldn't actually taste it (this is why only a splash is required). Enjoy.

hitchens on religion

Hitchens argues that "religion poisons everything" by demonstrating through numerous examples that the necessary stubbornness of faith obstructs that particular flavor of reason so essential to scientific progress, parliamentary democracy, and the defense and maintenance of the humanitarian values of the modern world. Although he never uses the word, the real culprit here is dogma: faith unavailable for revision under any circumstances. With a distinction between faith and dogma, we may be able to further bolster Hitchens' position. For, though Hitchens' critique is compelling in both its passion and its reason, his positive account of an areligious human society nevertheless rest upon two crucial articles of faith. In order to provide defense against his own arguments in a noncircular (and nondogmatic) fashion, Hitchens must emphasize that the foundational articles of faith in a humanistic society are not dogmatically held, and thus [can? - will?] not poison in the sense that religion "poisons."

The first article of faith upon which a humanistic society rests is faith in science. While all modern men share a deep sense that science makes progress, that science gets at the truth, that the experimental method is an effective sacrament against superstition and ensures access to the real, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to characterize the exact difference between such hard-won scientific "knowledge" and the divinely inspired "knowledge" of the religious zealot. In particular, Hume's discussion of the problem of induction demonstrates that there is a kernel of blind faith at the heart of the scientific endeavor (faith that the past will correspond to the future (in matters of causality, or physical law, say), a kernel which cannot be justified or defended in any noncircular manner. [This problem bleeds beyond science, for even the most basic rules of logic (modus ponens, say, or conjunction elimination, even) cannot be adequately characterized in the object language without their use in the metalanguage ~ a practice which avoids charges of circularity only through the artificial stratification of languages (but which remains conceptually circular in a profound sense).] Perhaps we can describe this kernel of faith as an undogmatic kernel ~ if the future should ever cease to be like the past, then we will revise our (mere) faith in the scientific method (and inductive reasoning in general). Not that any of the modern atheists do demonstrate such a pragmatic take on science (or that this weakened position is even easily statable in these post-Kuhnian days), yet Hitchens seems closest to such a level-headed approach, a crusader (we can at least imagine as) unafraid to weaken his position from dogma to the end of leveling a better attack against his foe.

Unfortunately, the second article of faith upon which Hitchens' humanism rests is not so easy to dismiss. In fact, it may amount to several distinct dogmas, the abandonment of any of which could scuttle Hitchens' entire argument. The problem at issue is the very source of the humanistic values which Hitchens defends and which are quintessential to Hitchens' argument against religion. For it is precisely the anecdotal violation of these values to which Hitchens repeatedly appeals as evidence that religion is "poison." Unless these humanistic values have some independent justification, Hitchens' appeal amounts to little more than rhetoric, a swaying of the audience's emotions rather than reason. How to defend these values? Hitchens seems not to realize that a defense is needed, or that there could be any question about their content. In various passages, however, he does seem to trace their source ultimately to natural rights, reason, and conscience. In particular, we may state the underlying Hitchensian many-dogmas-in-one as (something like) there is a single consistent ethical system characterized by natural rights, supported by reason, and revealed in the conscience of every modern man, and furthermore it corresponds to the system of modern humanism. Such a brash formulation may well be a mere straw man facsimile of Hitchens' actual view, but it is hard to make sense of his arguments without some such principle. Yet once it is stated in black and white, it is easily apprehended as a very fragile principle indeed. The notion of natural rights is simply too weak and circular to do the job the modern humanist demands of it; reason cannot provide an adequate basis for any normative theory (as Sidgwick so elegantly demonstrated in Methods of Ethics - to say nothing of the problems inherent in providing a noncircular characterization of reason in the first place); and the thesis that a conscience unmolded by prior ethical education (a mere manifestation of tradition) would develop humanistic values is entirely vacuous and unsupported.

However, these two problems are impediments to any modern liberal theory of society. One does not condemn Hitchens for his failure to adequately address these stumbling blocks, rather one applauds him for providing such a convincing argument that the only identifiable flaws are those which even the greatest minds before him have failed to avoid.